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possible to advance alternative arguments.35 In particular it can be suggested that by 
selling the property the original landlord makes it impossible to fulfi l his or her obliga-
tion under the option. The sale can therefore be analysed as an anticipatory breach 
of that obligation. That argument depends on how the option itself is analysed. It can 
be regarded as enforceable only so long as the original landlord remains owner and 
therefore automatically extinguished upon the transfer of the property. The alternative 
view, which accords with a general principle advanced by Gloag,36 is that the original 
landlord remains bound and will therefore be liable for breach of contract when he or 
she cannot perform. If that second view is correct, however, the obvious issue is what 
the original landlord can do so as not to be in breach. The matter should be dealt with 
expressly in the lease. Assuming, however, it is not, then one answer is that to avoid 
breach the original landlord must refrain from transferring. This seems unacceptably 
restrictive. A second answer is that there can be transfer but the successor landlord 
must be made to agree that the option is binding upon him or her. The effect, however, 
would be to undermine the inter naturalia doctrine. For that reason, the present 
writer prefers the view that the option is only binding upon the original landlord so 
long as he or she is owner. 
Andrew J M Steven
University of Edinburgh 
35 See in this regard the discussion of the position in England in S Tromans, “Options: as safe as houses?” 
(1984) 43 CLJ 55. 
36 W M Gloag, Contract, 2nd edn (1929) 264.
1 Josh Billings.
2 [2006] CSOH 58; 2006 SLT 591.
Personal Bar: Three Cases
One-half the troubles of this life can be traced to saying yes too quickly and not saying 
no soon enough.1
The “trouble” which Scots law commonly throws in the way of the rash and the hesitant 
is of course a plea of personal bar. The three cases considered below come from 
different conveyancing contexts, but for all, in one way or another, the “trouble” came 
from “not saying no soon enough”. But as so often, the plea of bar ended in failure. 
A. STATUTORY BAR AND LEASES
The fi rst case involved the statutory form of personal bar as set out in section 1(3) and 
(4) of the Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995. In the decade since these 
provisions were enacted surprisingly little litigation has occurred. The Advice Centre 
for Mortgages v McNicoll2 is the fi rst case to offer extended analysis in relation to leases. 
The pursuers sought a declarator that they were tenants of a shop property, basing 
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their claim on a series of unconcluded missives and an unexecuted lease. They argued 
that a real right had been acquired in terms of the Leases Act 1449, or alternatively, 
that the “landlord” was prevented by section 1(3) of the 1995 Act from withdrawing 
from the contract. In this connection they claimed that they had taken entry, paid rent, 
and carried out signifi cant improvements. Further arguments regarding an option to 
purchase arising from the lease are considered elsewhere in this issue.3 Personal bar 
was not established (nor a right based upon the 1449 Act). Nevertheless, the judge-
ment of Lord Drummond Young raised several important issues as to the operation 
of statutory bar. 
(1) The application of section 1(3) and (4) to leases and missives of let
The statutory form of bar applies only to those rights listed in section 1(2)(a), namely 
contracts for the creation, transfer, variation or extinction of real rights in land; non-
commercial gratuitous unilateral obligations; and certain types of trust.4 It cannot be 
used in relation to the rights listed in section 1(2)(b) and (c), namely the creation, 
transfer, variation, or extinction of a real right in land (as opposed to an obligation to 
undertake such juridical acts) and testamentary writings. However, this distinction 
between the constitution of contractual rights on the one hand and of real rights on 
the other is problematic with regard to missives of let and leases, which may encom-
pass both.5 Leases both create the tenant’s real right (once they are registered or 
possession is taken), and also constitute a bilateral contract. Similarly, missives of let 
constitute a contract for the creation of the lease, but may equally form the basis for 
the real right.
In this case, Lord Drummond Young had little diffi culty with regard to the lease. 
Since there had been an antecedent contract (albeit incomplete) followed by a separate 
lease, the former was clearly intended to embody the contract and the latter the real 
right. There was therefore no question of the provisions of the lease being validated 
by the statute.6 
Furthermore, as the missives did not meet the criteria for s 1(3) and (4) in any 
event, issues of categorisation did not arise. However, Lord Drummond Young noted 
with equanimity the suggestion that the possible role of missives of let in creating a 
real right might exclude them from the ambit of statutory bar, even in respect of their 
contractual aspect.7 He observed that if an informal lease was in place, entry was taken 
and rent paid, then the lease would be construed simply as an annual lease – a “sensible 
result”8 without the intervention of bar. These remarks indicate the general sentiment 
underlying his judgment that “there is no need to give [the 1995 provisions] a liberal 
interpretation … If parties do not adhere to the very simple requirements [of writing] 
3 By Andrew J M Steven at 432 above. 
4 Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995 s 1(3). The provisions do not extend to contracts etc not 
requiring writing under the 1995 Act, e.g. leases for less than one year: s 1(7).
5 See A McAllister, Scottish Law of Leases, 3rd edn (2002) para 2.5.
6 [2006] CSOH 58 at para 19.
7 Para 21, citing McAllister, Leases para 2.5.
8 Para 21.
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that are now prescribed, they have only themselves to blame.”9 However, a reading of 
section 1 which prevents leases and missives of let from being validated by the actings 
of the parties ascribes a very much narrower scope to statutory bar than to its common 
law predecessor,10 and arguably misconstrues its wording. The focus of section 1(3) is 
the nature of the right to be rescued from challenge, not the nature of any document in 
which it happened to be expressed. If, therefore, the necessary evidence of agreement 
can be adduced – no matter what the format – and the conditions of section 1(4) are 
met, then the contractual right may be placed beyond dispute, although the statute 
cannot save the real right in this way where formal writing is wanting. 
A further feature of this case was that the original proprietor, who had entered 
into missives and was designed as landlord on the draft lease, had moved on – the 
defender was its successor. In so far as the personal bar provisions relate only to the 
tenant’s personal right, preventing challenge to the validity of the contract rather 
than themselves creating the real right, there could be no issue here of the landlord’s 
successor being affected by them.11
(2) The required sequence of events
(a) Consensus
In order for the personal bar provisions to operate, a completed (if informal) agree-
ment must already exist.12 Advice Centre for Mortgages suggests that consensus must 
have been achieved not only on the essentials of the lease, but also on any other 
matters “treated by one or both of the parties as signifi cant”.13 On the facts, the incom-
plete missives disclosed agreement on entry, duration and rent, but the parties had 
not agreed on a further issue concerning the tenant’s option to purchase the premises. 
Lord Drummond Young held, therefore, that consensus had not been reached. For 
that reason also, bar could not be considered.14
(b) Referability of actings to the agreement
Section 1(4) further requires that, following upon informal agreement, “one of the 
parties has acted or refrained form acting in reliance upon it”. In this case, the putative 
tenants could not demonstrate that their actings were “referable”15 to the alleged 
agreement, since the chronology was wrong. The missive letters were exchanged, and 
the draft lease sent, several months after the actings (taking entry and refurbishing the 
premises) which were said to be in reliance upon the agreement. 
The statutory wording does not stipulate that the agreement should have been the 
exclusive cause of such actings, and in this it refl ects the pre-existing common law.16 
9 Para 16. 
10 And appears to exceed the intention of the Scottish Law Commission in proposing the legislation: see 
Report on Requirements of Writing (Scot Law Com No 112, 1988) paras 2.39-2.43.
11 Paras 17 and 23 per Lord Drummond Young.
12 Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995 s 1(3).
13 Para 9.
14 Para 21.
15 Para 33.
16 See Stewart v Stewart 1953 SLT 267.
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Nevertheless, the causal connection must be unequivocal.17 In Tom Super Printing 
Supplies Ltd v South Lanarkshire Council,18 for example, where the pursuers invoked 
section 1(3) and (4) to validate a variation of a contract with the defenders, the actings 
in question could have referred equally to the original contract and so the provisions 
were held not to apply. 
(3) The end of common law rei interventus and homologation
Section 1(5) of the 1995 Act states that the statutory form of bar superseded common 
law rei interventus and homologation in relation to the contracts and unilateral obliga-
tions listed in section 1(2)(a). However, it does not specifi cally disapply the common 
law rules in relation to the transactions specifi ed in section 1(2)(b) and (c) – the 
creation, transfer, variation, or extinction of a real right in land etc. On one view, this 
leaves open the possibility that the common law rules remain in place for the latter 
category.19 Lord Drummond Young ruled otherwise: “I am of opinion that the plain 
meaning of subsection (5) is that the previous law of rei interventus and homologation 
is superseded in its entirety.”20 His Lordship’s reading of the section also removed 
any uncertainty21 concerning the status of the controversial rule in Errol v Walker22 
(in which it was held that an agreement could be constituted by the writ of one party 
taken together with evidence of the actings of both parties). The basic rule stated 
by section 1(2) is that, save as otherwise provided by section 1 (3) and (4), a written 
document, complying with section 2 of the Act, is required for the obligations listed 
there. It follows that, as Lord Drummond Young stated, the Errol v Walker rule “no 
longer represents the law”.23
B. DELAY AND RELIANCE
In Park Lane Developments (Glasgow Harbour) Ltd v Jesner,24 a dispute had arisen 
out of missives for the defender’s purchase of a fl at within a new development. The 
missives provided for the conveyance of a car parking space, but the draft disposition 
eventually drawn up by the pursuers as sellers conveyed only a right of pro indiviso 
common ownership of the space. Accordingly the defender purported to rescind the 
contract on the basis of the pursuers’ material breach. In an action for implement 
the pursuers pled that, even if they had been in breach of contract, “the principles 
of personal bar, waiver or acquiescence” prevented the purchaser from rejecting the 
disposition as tendered. 
17 Cf, on the common law, Bell, Principles § 26; Stewart v Stewart 1953 SLT 267 at 269 per Lord Guthrie; 
but see Scottish Law Commission, Report on Requirements of Writing (n 10) paras 2.42 for commentary 
on statutory wording.
18 1999 GWD 31-1496.
19 See, e.g., R Rennie, “Requirements of writing: problems in practice” (1996) 1 SLPQ 187 at 193-194.
20 Para 22. 
21 See G Junor, “ Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995 section 1(3) etc – the extent of the provi-
sions” (1999) 67 Scottish Law Gazette 9 at 10.
22 1966 SC 93.
23 Para 30.
24 Glasgow Sheriff Court, 3 May 2006 (Sheriff C A L Scott).
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At no point had the defender indicated positive acceptance of the title as offered, 
but he had taken a long time to say no. His agents did not query the disposition until 
one week before the date of entry, some nine months after conclusion of missives and 
six months after receipt of the draft deed. A deed of conditions, indicating common 
ownership of parking spaces in the development, had been registered after conclusion 
of missives and before the date of entry, although admittedly this did not appear to 
have been exhibited to the purchasers. Nevertheless, pleas of personal bar and waiver 
were rejected. 
Reasonably enough, Sheriff Scott did not regard the defender’s delay as excessive or 
misleading, on the basis that the objection had been raised prior to the settlement date. 
In addition, he appeared to accept the defender’s argument that: “there was no indica-
tion that the pursuers had conducted their affairs on the basis that the right [to resile] 
had been abandoned. They merely continued with the transaction because…they 
were entitled to do so”. This requires qualifi cation in that it is questionable whether 
absence of reliance may always be regarded as decisive. In many situations A and B 
have been engaged in an ongoing interaction which A has the power to alter. If A fails 
to do so, B in the meantime has often been entirely passive, wishing only for the status 
quo to be maintained. Logically therefore, if B argues that A is barred from altering 
the status quo, B is unlikely to be able to demonstrate reliance in terms of positive 
action. To require reliance in the conventional sense is thus tantamount to excluding 
personal bar where this fact pattern occurs. In such circumstances, therefore, delay by 
A, coupled with other features of unfairness, has sometimes been suffi cient to bring 
bar into play.25 This is particularly true of the context from which (perhaps rather 
unaccountably) counsel drew the defi nition of waiver26 – that of criminal procedure. 
If the accused (or a litigant in a civil case for that matter) delays unduly in taking a 
procedural step which would otherwise have been open to him or her, the prosecution 
cannot be said to rely on such delay, since it has merely carried on as before, and yet 
bar may nonetheless apply. 
One further minor but important point arising from this case is that the pursuers 
referred to a “title pack” relating to the same development, exhibited to the defender’s 
agents three months after conclusion of missives but in relation to a transaction with 
another client. It was not apparent whether this material revealed the status of the 
parking spaces, but, in any event, Sheriff Scott was not prepared to attribute any 
signifi cance to it. Clearly personal bar cannot rest on a person’s failure to respond to 
information specifi cally directed at another party – even if serendipity might have 
brought it his or her way.
C. REASONABLE RELIANCE
In Ben Cleuch Estates Ltd v Scottish Enterprise,27 the problem was less a delay in 
saying no28 than positive actions creating a false impression. An action was brought for 
25 E.g. Banks v Mecca Bookmakers (Scotland) Ltd 1982 SC 7 (delay in landlord bringing rent review). 
26 Millar v Dickson 2002 SC (PC) 30 at para 31 per Lord Bingham of Cornhill. 
27 [2006] CSOH 35.
28 Issues of acquiescence and waiver were not explored in detail: see paras 156-157.
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declarator that the break option in a commercial lease had not been validly exercised by 
the tenants: the required notice had been sent to Bonnytoun Estates Ltd, when in fact 
the landlord was Ben Cleuch Estates Ltd, the parent company of which Bonnytoun 
was a subsidiary. In its defence, the tenants argued, inter alia, that the landlord was 
barred from denying the effectiveness of the notice.
The main gist of the personal bar defence was that Ben Cleuch’s agents had led 
the tenants to believe that Bonnytoun was the landlord. Invoices for rent were sent 
in the name of Bonnytoun, and miscellaneous correspondence and emails referred to 
Bonnytoun in similar terms. However, as Lord Reed noted, “the fact that a representa-
tion has been made, and that the representee has acted in reliance on the representa-
tion, does not necessarily give rise to personal bar”.29 What is required in addition is 
that reliance upon the representation should have been reasonable:30 would a reason-
able person have been induced to act as the representee did?31 Given the value of 
the right at issue – a lease in which the annual rent was £210,700 – the break notice 
required considerable care. The tenants’ solicitor, who served the notice, might have 
been expected to take the trouble to check all the correspondence relating to the 
lease, which would have disclosed the position. Moreover, his Lordship accepted the 
evidence of a director of Ben Cleuch as to his expectation that a person serving a 
formal notice of this nature would check with “primary sources such as the records at 
Companies House”32 – in other words the defenders’ reliance was not only unreason-
able but also unforeseeable. Declarator was accordingly granted. 
This was a clearly a hard case. Lord Reed refl ected that “an adventitious bonus” 
was being handed to the pursuers, “enabling them to take unmeritorious advantage of 
the defenders’ error when they realised perfectly well that the defenders intended to 
exercise their entitlement under the break clause”.33 Nevertheless, this case demon-
strates the important principle that the one party’s inconsistency – or even impropriety 
 – is not enough for personal bar. Fairness requires the conduct of both parties to be 
considered, and bar cannot apply if, in the assessment of the court which hears the 
facts, the other party has responded unreasonably. 
Elspeth Reid
University of Edinburgh
29 Para 148, by reference to Gatty v Maclaine 1921 SC (HL) 1 at 7 per Lord Birkenhead.
30 Para 149.
31 Para 150.
32 Para 154.
33 Para 138.
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